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BUDGETARY 
CONTROL IN A 
MANUFACTURING 
PLANT:
THE PROBLEMS AND PLANS FOR 
IMPROVEMENT 
AN EXTENDED CASE STUDY
Michael A. Novak
The Situation
The case involves a relatively in­
dependent subsidiary of a large na­
tional corporation. The subsidiary, 
herein referred to as MANU, employs 
a total work force of just under 500 
people. It is basically a small order 
job shop, producing sophisticated, 
miniature motors, requiring skilled 
engineering and machining. The 
subsidiary had been a family owned 
and operated company for 20 years, 
having been bought out by the cor­
poration in 1967. Most of the 
employees have been with the com­
pany over 15 years. Most persons in 
managerial positions have come up 
through the ranks.
The author was called in as a con­
sultant to design and conduct a 
management training program for 
the lower level managers (man­
agers, supervisors and foremen), 
most of whom had little or no formal 
managerial education. The author 
agreed to enter the system not under 
the above contract but rather to do 
an analysis of the entire manage­
ment system and to offer action 
recommendations — one of which 
might well be a management train­
ing program.
During the course of forty in­
dividual interviews and five small 
group sessions, six major issues sur­
faced, one of which was referred to 
as “scorekeeping” — the process for 
monitoring a unit’s productivity and 
efficiency. The interviews and group 
sessions included all management 
levels. On the issue of scorekeeping, 
basically two differing viewpoints 
emerged, one being held by the plant 
manager and his staff while the other 
was held by middle and lower level 
managers.
A summary statement agreed 
on by these lower-level man­
agers was that the scorekeep­
ing system was inaccurate, 
unfair and demoralizing.
The lower managers saw the situa­
tion as follows: 1) when the monthly 
shipping-dollar goal is met, no ques­
tions are asked, no one seems too 
worried about high amounts of over­
time, waste or low efficiency; 2) 
when the goal is not met, perform­
ance and procedures throughout the 
system are scrutinized and some­
body gets blamed for the failure; 3) 
meeting the goal every month seems 
at times to be less efficient than 
being flexible and meeting goals ev­
ery 3 or 4 months — monthly goals 
force overtime near the end of the 
month and create slack time during 
the first week of the following month 
— some orders for the month fall 
through, thereby necessitating some 
orders in the following month to be 
moved up; 4) “dollars-shipped” 
seems to be an unfair and over­
simplified unit of account for assess­
ing each department’s efficiency and 
productivity — for example, one 
department loses “A labor,” which is 
produced hours, when it has to do 
“rework” caused by some other 
department’s error; 5) routine, in­
dividual performance appraisal is 
basically negative — records are 
kept only of failures and not for what 
is done well or over and above what 
is required; recognition and positive 
reinforcement in the form of a bonus 
usually occur only at the end of the 
year and are usually uniform across 
each level; 6) when a target date is 
missed anywhere along the line, no 
one is really accountable — it’s al­
ways the other guy’s fault. A summ­
ary statement agreed on by these 
managers was that the scorekeeping 
system was inaccurate, unfair and 
demoralizing.
From top management’s point of 
view: 1) the scorekeeping system is 
not oversimplified but considers 
yield, efficiency and produced 
hours; 2) the system is fair and accu­
rate with realistic and flexible limits 
on yield, efficiency, produced hours, 
rework, scrap, overtime, etc. — all to 
be brought in line under total cost; 3) 
the lower level managers take too 
simplified of an approach to solving 
their problems and only consider 
one dimension at a time, such as 
overtime, produced hours or efficien­
cy; 4) these managers do not seem to 
be committed to “getting the job 
done” or “taking ownership for the 
dollars-to-be-shipped” but rather are 
concerned about “playing it safe 
and worry only about their narrow 
job, not its impact on others.”
There seems to be two basic ques­
tions. Is the unit of account over­
simplified or the application of it? Is 
there a lack of ownership on the part 
of some managers or is there 
nothing to own?1 There are several 
additional related but subsidiary 
issues which will be discussed in 
terms of the above two.
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Analysis
In analyzing the above, the author 
identified a) the violation of several 
management accounting principles 
and b) the formation of dysfunctional 
interpersonal behavior cycles which 
seemed to explain the problems and 
point to possible solutions.
The types of accounting informa­
tion that Simon identified as necess­
ary in order for a manager to answer 
three basic managerial questions 
[Simon, 1957, p. 20] — were either 
not provided adequately by the ac­
counting system or, if provided, were 
not being used. The three questions 
Simon posed are: 1) “Am I doing well 
or badly?” (a performance appraisal 
focus), 2) “What problems should I 
look into?” (an attention-directing 
focus), and 3) “Of the several ways of 
doing the job, which is the best?” (a 
problem solving focus).
At all managerial levels in MANU, 
there was agreement that question 
No. 1 was handled only partially and 
that part was “failure feedback.” At 
staff meetings, failures were zeroed 
in on while accomplishments were 
taken for granted. The accounting 
system had data on accomplish­
ments but the management system 
only focused on the failures. This at­
titude was very strong in the plant 
manager and, not surprisingly, was 
transmitted down through all man­
agerial levels.
With regard to question No. 2, the 
plant manager focused only on 
negative results such as too much 
overtime or too few productive 
hours. Moreover, his focus was on 
outcomes and not their causes. His 
manner of verbalizing “what the 
problem is” and, therefore, where at­
tention should be directed was per­
ceived by his mangerial team as nar­
row and over simplified. Some mem­
bers of the team explained that his 
meaning and intent was broader and 
more complete than his words. Upon 
further questioning, these same peo­
ple acknowledged that he rarely if 
ever verbalized his full intent. A typi­
cal declaration of the plant manager 
after a month of high overtime was 
“no overtime this month.” Some of 
his managers took him literally and 
some figuratively. The effect seemed 
to be confusion, anger and protec­
tive entrenchment by the lower man­
agers in response to such perceived 
overreaction.
Regarding question no. 3, problem 
solving for the best solutions, the ac­
counting system provided informa­
tion on all the dimensions (produced 
hours, etc.) but not in a related or in­
tergrated way in which probable 
consequences could be calculated 
by production managers or super­
visors. The information was not man­
ageably or relevantly packaged. 
Most managers only considered one 
or two dimensions and never tried to 
look at the total interactive effect of 
all the dimensions in solving prob­
lems. Only two high level managers 
seemed able and interested in an in­
tegration of all the dimensions. The 
chief accountant was one. While he 
could discuss the integration, he 
acknowledged at a group session 
that he was not sure how to weight 
the various dimensions to minimize 
total cost for a specific problematic 
situation. It must be recalled that the 
job shop nature of the plant is not 
characterized by firm long-range 
planning, the scheduling of large or­
ders, or by a stable recurring product 
base. Small orders and short lead- 
time orders requiring highly 
specialized parts, engineering and 
machining militate against any 
useful calculation of probable con­
sequences of decisions. There are 
few constants and many critical 
variables.
Contrary to Simon’s recommenda­
tion, the three distinct management 
accounting functions of perform­
ance appraisal, attention-directing 
and problem solving were not man­
ned by separate full-time accoun­
tants. However, the head of prod­
uction (who was new to this position 
but not new in the company) ex­
pected his managerial subordinates 
to know how to use the accounting 
data available for attention-directing 
and problem solving. He was the one 
person other than the chief accoun­
tant who had the clearest under­
standing of how most of the dimen­
sions interacted (which probably ex­
plains why he was given the Prod­
uction head job). He expected his 
managers to be able to manage in a 
similar fashion. His expectations 
were highly inappropriate since 1) 
there was no accountant directly 
responsible for these management 
accounting functions to advise the 
managers, 2) his managers had no 
previous education or training in 
how to conceptualize issues in these 
terms and 3) the present top man­
agerial practice (noted above) ex­
emplified a simplistic, unidimen­
sional use of accounting data.
Norms for the Selection of Ac­
counting Practices
In light of Simon’s three functions, 
Horngren presents five guides or 
norms for the selection of manage­
ment accounting practices [Anton 
and Firmin, 1972]. These norms will 
be used as an outline for the remain­
ing analysis of the case in point.
Horngren takes as his starting 
point the concept of relevancy. He 
defines relevant broadly as that data 
which will lead to an optimum deci­
sion [Anton/Firmin, p. 6]. He dis­
tinguishes relevancy (that which is 
valid and pertinent) from accuracy 
(precision). Figures can be precise 
but irrelevant, imprecise yet relevant. 
A key part of relevancy is timeliness. 
Highly accurate but stale data are ir­
relevant because they have no bear­
ing on the decisions facing the reci­
pient. Recalling the job shop 
character of the case in point, the 
relevant data available is usually im­
precise. Yet, there is neither time nor 
opportunity to figure ahead of time 
what information will be needed in 
order to improve the accuracy since 
there is so little regularity in the 
system.
The first norm: Focus the basic 
design of the accounting system 
upon the responsibility centers of in­
dividual managers. Ideally, particu­
lar revenues and costs would be 
recorded and automatically traced 
to the one individual responsible for 
the item (Anton/Firmin, p. 8). 
Horngren’s practical conclusion that 
the diffusion of control throughout 
the organization complicates the
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The accounting system had
data on accomplishments but
the management system only
focused on the failures
task of collecting relevant data by 
responsibility centers seems true in 
this case. The work flow, com­
munication flow, and decision flow 
are each complex, due to high inter­
dependence among departments 
and work units caused by high situa­
tional variability.
In a group session with managers 
and the chief accountant, the follow­
ing situation came to light. The com­
pany has been divided into cost cen­
ters, each responsible for submitting 
a budget. Top management has 
reviewed and revised them accord­
ing to goals and constraints. The 
revised budgets have not normally 
been communicated back down to 
the cost centers — a management 
rather than an accounting break­
down. Further, cost centers have 
been able to overspend without 
departmental control. Due to omis­
sion rather than plan, control has 
been left to the chief accountant who 
cleared requests until the money ran 
out and then rejected all requests. 
One result has been that conscien­
tious people who waited and 
carefully planned their budgets 
usually found there was nothing left 
when they submitted their request.
The impact on the lower managers 
in charge of cost centers has been 
cynicism and disbelief when they 
have been told to take ownership 
and take charge of their cost cen­
ters. They do not perceive them­
selves as having real control or as 
having been treated as “people in 
charge.” Responsibility has not 
really been delegated. The words 
have been said but the actions have 
not been taken by top management.
Horngren’s second norm: Study 
and delineate individual managers’ 
needs in relation to their sphere of 
responsibility and the objectives of 
the organization as a whole [An- 
ton/Firmin, p. 9]. This norm main­
tains that the management accoun­
tant must evaluate the influence of 
the accounting system on the 
motivations of individuals. As dis­
cussed earlier, the misuse of the ac­
counting system by focusing only on 
failures and sending down one­
dimensional messages, “No over­
time,” was perceived by lower man­
agers as threatening and over­
simplified. They saw that no over­
time, meant to save money, could 
wind up costing the company 
money. Blanket, unqualified 
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messages made the accounting 
system appear impractical, unfair 
and creating more and more bur­
dens for the managers. Managers’ 
needs for help — information and 
training — to keep overtime down, 
produced hours up, yield up and effi­
ciency up were not met by one­
dimensional statements. Again top 
management lost credibility.
That lower managers would “pro­
tect” themselves and their work units 
in order to look good on perform­
ance reports even to the detriment of 
the company as a whole is under­
standable in light of the above. They 
perceived that no assistance was 
coming to help them avoid less than 
optimal decisions, yet such mistakes 
were not totally their fault. Since 
blaming and head-hunting would 
follow failure, survival meant pro­
tecting oneself, making sure blame 
fell somewhere else. Getting the job 
done followed only after one was 
protected.
Top management was aware of 
the above “protecting” “ducking” 
and “not getting the job done.” They 
were not aware that the messages 
they were sending down gave good 
cause for such behavior.
Horngren’s third norm: Scorekeep­
ing data should be accurate. This 
has not been possible for each work 
unit since no feasible system has 
been found to track the quality of the 
job done as work passes from one 
unit to the next. What is found to be 
intolerable to specifications might 
be due to machine error, vendor er­
ror, or engineering error. Moreover, 
as deadlines draw near, tolerances 
loosen up and what passes now 
would not have passed yesterday.
In some areas scrap has been 
reduced. Much of that reduction is 
believed attributable to a tighter re­
porting system. In effect, much of the 
previously reported scrap might well 
have existed only on paper.
Horngren’s fourth norm: Budgets 
or standards should be understood 
and accepted as reasonably attaina­
ble goals [Anton/Firmin, p. 12]. The 
previously recounted budgeting 
practice points out that through the 
lack of downward communication 
the budget was not understood and, 
through the lack of departmental 
control or cost center control, was 
not accepted. To paraphrase many 
supervisors, “the budget is a farce.” 
Similarly, standards or policies deal­
Close, direct, active contacts 
between accountants and 
operating managers appears 
to be non-existent.
ing with overtime, produced hours, 
etc. also have made little sense and 
have gained little acceptance by 
lower managers, due primarily to the 
manner in which they have been pre­
sented. The close, direct, active con­
tacts between accountants and 
operating managers necessary to 
strengthen understanding and ac­
ceptability of standards, budgets 
and reports as measuring devices of 
performance [Simon, 1957] appears 
to be non-existent at MANU below 
the top management level.
Instead of ducking, entrenching, 
blaming or doing nothing about the 
scorekeeping system, the production 
engineer exercised some responsi­
ble initiative in submitting a pro­
posal to the previous head and also 
to the present head of Production. 
However, he never received a 
response to the proposal.
Horngren’s fifth norm: The items 
used to judge performance must be 
controllable by the recipient. The 
high interdependency among 
departments and units at MANU mili­
tate against controllability of items. 
For example, a shipping foreman 
must manage overtime and yield. 
However, even it the foreman 
decides to work overtime for the 
sake of needed yield, twelve sig­
natures are required to proceed as 
decided. Some of those signatures 
come from foremen of other depart­
ments such as quality control and 
maintenance who have to be willing 
to work overtime with shipping. If 
they find that they cannot possibly 
handle more overtime, they may 
refuse to sign. The shipping foreman 
then must go up a few levels to 
secure more leverage to get the 
needed signatures. If the shipping 
foreman wins, the quality control 
foreman loses control of his/her 
overtime and vice-versa.
Once again, top management has 
expressed the expectation that the 
foreman’s job is to manage such 
matters and take control of items 
such as overtime, conflicts notwith­
standing. From the foremen’s point 
of view, they wind up fighting the 
whole system and possibly messing 
up fellow foremen while controlling 
their own times.
Budgetary Control Revisions: 
A New Plan
The above analysis was presented 
to, discussed with and challenged by 
the new (present) head of Production 
four months after he assumed the 
new position. He eventually ac­
cepted most of the analysis.
Two months later, after much con­
sultation, the new chief accountant 
presented the following budgeting 
and budgetary control process for 
variable expenses.
1. Primary budgetary control is to 
be decentralized to cost centers. 
Each center is to track its commit­
ments in terms of “when committed” 
rather than “when received.” In 
order for “tracking via commit­
ments” to be useful accounting in­
formation to managers, each requis­
tion must have as accurate a cost 
estimate as possible. If cost estimat­
ing assistance is needed, managers 
are expected (and will be held ac­
countable) for seeking assistance 
and suggestions from the Purchas­
ing Agent or the Industrial Buying 
Center. This is a new norm for the 
system.
2. If a cost center manager needs 
to exceed his budget, he is to go up 
one level to see if he can “borrow” 
money for that month from another 
unit within his boss’ division or 
department. If there is no money at 
that level, with the help of his boss 
he is to go up another level and so 
on, all the way to the plant manager 
— a form of flexible budgeting.
3. If a center manager does not 
spend his quota for the month, it can 
be accrued for the remainder of the 
quarter. In the past, each center went 
back to zero.
4. Continuing to reinforce flex­
ibility and cost center responsibility, 
the new plan states that a manager 
can choose to spend his budget 
differently from the initial budget 
breakdown.
5. Should someone else want a 
part of a given manager’s budget, 
that manager must be consulted. If 
he chooses not to release some of 
his funds but is overruled by his 
boss, he will receive a formal notice 
of his new budget to protect him dur­
ing a future performance evaluation. 
Further, no one has a right to sign 
requistion charged to someone else 
— another new norm.
6. If the total division budget (e.g. 
for Production) begins to be ex­
ceeded, a given manager may be cut 
back even if he has been in line. 
Again, formal notice will be given on 
budget cutbacks and the revised 
priorities which justify the cutback 
and protect that manager. Also, 
Production has the flexibility to 
“buy” overtime dollars by giving up 
other variable expense dollars.
7. The new system also attempts to 
clarify and break-out “uncontrolla­
bles.” Managers are to take special 
care to eliminate from their budget 
print-out items which they do not 
control such as depreciation. Man­
agers will be held responsible for 
those items that they and Account­
ing finally agree are under their con­
trol. This practice is in close agree­
ment with Bentley’s position on the 
question of who controls costs and, 
therefore, where responsibility 
should be placed. Bentley [1978, p. 
195] writes:
In every company with which I 
have been involved, depreciation 
is charged to the activity using the 
equipment. This is done on the 
concept that depreciation is the 
cost of using the equipment. This 
is not so; depreciation is a finan­
cial charge against profits aimed 
at recovering the original cost of 
the item not previously charged 
against profits and will need to be 
charged whether or not the asset 
is used. The local activity manager 
rarely has any say in the financing 
of capital purchases, yet he is 
charged depreciation, an item 
over which he has no control. If he 
hired the equipment he would only 
need to pay when he used it but he 
rarely has the opportunity of 
choosing whether to hire or buy.
In the remainder of his article, 
Bentley presents the budgetary con­
trol process as being established in 
reverse of the way it has traditionally 
been established. He begins by ask­
ing “At what level are managers 
going to be held accountable for 
costs?” The answer will then deter- 
The attention upper-level man­
agement gave to the com­
plaints and suggestions of 
lower-level managers resulted 
in the new budgetary control 
system.
mine the company’s organization 
structure, the individual respon­
sibilities of managers, the form and 
detail of the accounting system, the 
frequency and timing of data collec­
tion and the form of the control re­
porting system.
The attention upper level manage­
ment and specifically the new head 
of Production gave to the complaints 
and suggestions of lower level man­
agers resulted in the new budgetary 
control system, evidencing great 
sensitivity to the role and needs of 
cost center managers. The new 
system begins with the question at 
what level are managers going to be 
held accountable for costs and 
builds the rest of the system accord­
ing to the answer.
Unfortunately, since the system is 
new, there is no evidence as to 
whether or not the system works. 
However, on paper the new system 
attempts to employ many of the cur­
rent norms for management ac­
counting, and has been received 
with great enthusiasm and relief by 
the managers. It remains to be seen 
whether both upper and lower man­
agement use the new system or 
revert to previous patterns.
Gifford-Gifford and James [1976] 
have devised a schematic, diagram 
for use by accountants and others 
concerned with effective manage­
ment accounting. The schematic 
contains the basic points to be con­
sidered (or actions to be taken) for 
providing management with the rele­
vant accounting information it 
needs. This schematic has been of 
service to MANU in terms of monitor­
ing Accounting and Production per­
formance in implementing the new 
system (See Exhibit 1)
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Diagram A.
Consider agreed strategies 
and programs. Analyze 
present procedures, noting 
interrelationships.
Note constraints and 
potential problem areas; 
and dependent information 
systems.
Appreciate corporate and 
industry ethos.
Understand behavioral 
aspects of the organization — 
particularly the objectives 
of individuals.
Determine the decisions 
which are needed.
 
Learn managers’ 
information requirements
 
Design a report to meet 
these.
From feedback, monitor 
success of information 
system in achieving 
corporate and individual 
objectives.
Give an interpretation 
on data collected.
 
Communicate and get 
feedback on usefulness 
of report from managers.
Note
1The usage of the term ownership is collo­
quial rather than legal or technical. Owner­
ship is defined as an acceptance by an in­
dividual or group of full responsibility for the 
success of a given task no matter what effort 
is required. The effort required implies going 
beyond normal procedures and job descrip­
tions if necessary to get the job done. Accep­
tance of full responsibility implies not blaming 
anyone else if there is failure.
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